The latest example is a post by Marcus Christian about the CyberVor network -- a network that stole 4.5 billion credentials, including 1.2 billion passwords. The data cited in support of its authoritarianism has little value.
A "billion" credentials sounds like a lot, but in reality, few of those credentials are valid. In a separate incident yesterday, 5 million Gmail passwords were dumped to the Internet. Google analyzed the passwords and found only 2% were valid, and that automated defenses would likely have blocked exploitation of most of them. Certainly, 100,000 valid passwords is a large number, but it's not the headline 5 million number.
That's the norm in cyber. Authoritarian types who want to sell you something can easily quote outrageous headline numbers, and while others can recognize the data are hyped, few have the technical expertise to adequately rebut them. I speak at hacker conferences on the topic of password hacking  ; I can assure you those headline numbers are grossly inflated. They may be true after a fashion, but they do no imply what you think they do.
That blog post also cites a study by CSIS/McAfee claiming the economic cost of cybercrime is $475 billion per year. This number is similarly inflated, between 10 to 100 times.
We know the sources of income for hackers, such as credit card fraud, ransomware, and DDoS extortion. Of these, credit card fraud is by far the leading source of income. According to a July 2014 study by the US DoJ and FTC, all credit card fraud world-wide amounts to $5.55 billion per year. Since we know that less than half of this is due to hackers, and that credit card fraud is more than half of what hackers earn, this sets the upper limit on hacker income -- about 1% of what CSIS/McAfee claim as the cost of cybercrime. Of course, the costs incurred by hackers can be much higher than their income, but knowing their income puts us in the right ballpark.
Where CSIS/McAfee get their eye-popping numbers is vague estimates about such things as "loss of reputation" and "intellectual property losses". These numbers are arbitrary, depending upon a wide range of assumptions. Since we have no idea where they get such numbers, we can't put much faith in them.
Some of what they do divulge about their methods is obviously flawed. For example, when discussing why some countries don't report cybercrime losses, they say:
that some countries are miraculously unaffected by cybercrime despite having no better defenses than countries with similar income levels that suffer higher loss—seems improbableThis is wrong for two enormous reasons.
I developed a popular tool for scanning the Internet, and use it often to scan everything. Among the things this has taught me is that countries vary enormously, both in the way they exploit the Internet and in their "defenses". Two neighboring countries with similar culture and economic development can nonetheless vary widely in their Internet usage. In my person experience, it is not improbable that two countries with similar income levels will suffer different losses.
The second reason the above statement is wrong is their view of "defenses", as if the level of defense (anti-virus, firewalls, intrusion prevention) has a bearing on rates of hacking. It doesn't. It's like cars: what matters most as to whether you die in an accident is how often you drive, how far, where, and how good a driver you are. What matters less are "defenses" like air bags and anti-lock brakes. That's why automobile death rates in America correlate with things like recessions, the weather, building of freeways, and cracking down on dunk drivers. What they don't correlate with are technological advances in "defenses" like air bags. These "defenses" aren't useless, of course, but drivers respond by driving more aggressively and paying less attention to the road. The same is true in cyber, technologies like intrusion prevention aren't a magic pill that ward off hackers, but a tool that allows increased risk taking and different tradeoffs when exploiting the Internet. What you get from better defenses is increased profits from the Internet, rather than decreased losses. I say this as the inventor of the "intrusion prevention system", a popular cyber-defense that is now a $2 billion/year industry.
That McAfee and CSIS see "defenses" the wrong way reflects the fact that McAfee wants to sell "defensive" products, and CSIS wants to sell authoritarian legislation. Their report is not an honest assessment from experts, but an attempt to persuading people into buying what these organizations have to sell.
By the way, that posts mentions "SQL injection". It's a phrase you should pay attention to because it's been the most common way of hacking websites for over a decade. It's so easy teenagers with little skill can do SQL injection to hack websites. It's also easily preventable, just use a thing called "parameterized queries" instead of a thing called "string pasting". Yet, schools keep pumping out website designers that know nothing of SQL injection and who "paste strings" together. This leads to the intractable problem that if you hire a university graduate to do your website, they'll put SQL injection flaws in the code that your neighbor's kid will immediately hack. Companies like McAfee try to sell you defenses like "WAFs" that only partly defend against the problem. The solution isn't adding "defenses" like WAFs, but to change the code from "string pasting" to "parameterized queries" which does completely prevent the problem. That our industry thinks in terms of "adding defenses" from vendors like McAfee, instead of just fixing the problem, is why cybersecurity has become intractable in recent years.
In conclusion, rather than an "analysis" as Eugene Volokh claims, this post from Marcus Christian was transparent lobbying for legislation, with the standard distortion of data that the word "lobbying" implies. Readers of that blog shouldn't treat it as anything more than that.