Tuesday, December 07, 2021

Journalists: stop selling NFTs that you don't understand

The reason you don't really understand NFTs is because the journalists describing them to you don't understand them, either. We can see that when they attempt to sell an NFT as part of their stories (e.g. AP and NYTimes). They get important details wrong.

The latest is Reason.com magazine selling an NFT. As libertarians, you'd think at least they'd get the technical details right. But they didn't. Instead of selling an NFT of the artwork, it's just an NFT of a URL. The URL points to OpenSea, which is known to remove artwork from its site (such as in response to DMCA takedown requests).

If you buy that Reason.com NFT, what you'll actually get is a token pointing to:


This is just the metadata, which in turn contains a link to the claimed artwork:


If either OpenSea or Google removes the linked content, then any connection between the NFT and the artwork disappears.

It doesn't have to be this way. The correct way to do NFT artwork is to point to a "hash" instead which uniquely identifies the work regardless of where it's located. That $69 million Beeple piece was done this correct way. It's completely decentralized. If the entire Internet disappeared except for the Ethereum blockchain, that Beeple NFT would still work.

This is an analogy for the entire blockchain, cryptocurrency, and Dapp ecosystem: the hype you hear ignores technical details. They promise an entirely decentralized economy controlled by math and code, rather than any human entities. In practice, almost everything cheats, being tied to humans controlling things. In this case, the "Reason.com NFT artwork" is under control of OpenSea and not the "owner" of the token.

Journalists have a problem. NFTs selling for millions of dollars are newsworthy, and it's the journalists place to report news rather than making judgements, like whether or not it's a scam. But at the same time, journalists are trying to explain things they don't understand. Instead of standing outside the story, simply quoting sources, they insert themselves into the story, becoming advocates rather than reporters. They can no longer be trusted as an objective observers.

From a fraud perspective, it may not matter that the Reason.com NFT points to a URL instead of the promised artwork. The entire point of the blockchain is caveat emptor in action. Rules are supposed to be governed by code rather than companies, government, or the courts. There is no undoing of a transaction even if courts were to order it, because it's math.

But from a journalistic point of view,  this is important. They failed at an honest description of what actually the NFT contains. They've involved themselves in the story, creating a conflict of interest. It's now hard for them to point out NFT scams when they themselves have participated in something that, from a certain point of view, could be viewed as a scam.

Sunday, November 07, 2021

Example: forensicating the Mesa County system image

Tina Peters, the election clerk in Mesa County (Colorado) went rogue and dumped disk images of an election computer on the Internet. They are available on the Internet via BitTorrent [Mesa1][Mesa2], The Colorado Secretary of State is now suing her over the incident.

The lawsuit describes the facts of the case, how she entered the building with an accomplice on Sunday, May 23, 2021. I thought I'd do some forensics on the image to get more details.

Specifically, I see from the Mesa1 image that she logged on at 4:24pm and was done acquiring the image by 4:30pm, in and (presumably) out in under 7 minutes.

In this blogpost, I go into more detail about how to get that information.

The image

To download the Mesa1 image, you need a program that can access BitTorrent, such as the Brave web browser or a BitTorrent client like qBittorrent. Either click on the "magnet" link or copy/paste into the program you'll use to download. It takes a minute to gather all the "metadata" associated with the link, but it'll soon start the download:

What you get is file named EMSSERVER.E01. This is a container file that contains both the raw disk image as well as some forensics metadata, like the date it was collected, the forensics investigator, and so on. This container is in the well-known "EnCase Expert Witness" format. EnCase is a commercial product, but its container format is a quasi-standard in the industry.

Some freeware utilities you can use to open this container and view the disk include "FTK Imager", "Autopsy", and on the Linux command line, "ewf-tools".

However you access the E01 file, what you most want to look at is the Windows operating-system logs. These are located in the directory C:\Windows\system32\winevtx. The standard Windows "Event Viewer" application can load these log files to help you view them.

When inserting a USB drive to create the disk image, these event files will be updated and written to that disk before the image was taken. Thus, we can see in the event files all the events that happen right before the disk image happens.

Disk image acquisition

Here's what the event logs on the Mesa1 image tells us about the acquisition of the disk image itself.

The person taking the disk image logged in at 4:24:16pm, directly to the console (not remotely), on their second attempt after first typing an incorrect password. The account used was "emsadmin". Their NTLM password hash is 9e4ec70af42436e5f0abf0a99e908b7a. This is a "role-based" account rather than an individual's account, but I think Tina Peters is the person responsible for the "emsadmin" roll.

Then, at 4:26:10pm, they connected via USB a Western Digital  "easystore™" portable drive that holds 5-terabytes. This was mounted as the F: drive.

The program "Access Data FTK Imager" was run from the USB drive (F:\FTK Imager\FTK Imager.exe) in order to image the system. The image was taken around 4:30pm, local Mountain Time (10:30pm GMT).

It's impossible to say from this image what happened after it was taken. Presumably, they immediately hit "eject" on the drive, logged off, and disconnected the hard drive. Thus from beginning to end, it took about 7 minutes to take the image once they sat down at the computer.

Dominion Voting Systems

The disk image is that of a an "EMS Server" part of the Dominion Voting Suite. This is a server on an air-gapped network (not connected to any other network) within the count offices.

Most manuals for Colorado are online, though some bits and pieces are missing, and can be found in documents posted to other state's websites (though each state does things a little different, so such cross referencing can't be completely trusted).

The locked room with an air-gapped network  you see in the Mesa County office appears to look like the following, an "EMS Standard" configuration (EMS stands for Election Management System).

This small network is "air gapped", meaning there is no connection from this network to any other network in the building, nor out to the Internet. By looking at the logs from the Mesa1 image, we can see what this network looks like:
  • The EMS Server is named "EMSERVER" with IP address and MAC address 44-A8-42-30-01-5D. The hard drive matches Dominion's specs: a 1-terabyte boot drive (C:) and a 2-terabyte data drive (D:) that is shared with the rest of the network as \\EMSERVER\NAS. This also acts as the network's DHCP and DNS server.
  • At least one network printer, model Dell E310dw.
  • Two EMS Workstations (EMSCLIENT01 and EMSCLIENT02). This is where users spend most of their time, before an election to create the ballots, and after all the ballots have been counted to construct the final tally.
  • Four ImageCast Central (ICC) (ICC01 - ICC04) scanners, for automatically scanning and tabulating ballots.
  • Two Adjudication Workstations (ADJCLIENT01 and ADJCLIENT03). These are used when the scanners reject ballots, such as when somebody does a write-in candidate, or marks two candidates. Humans need to get involved to make the final judgement on what the ballot actually says.

Note this isn't the machines you'd expect to see in a precinct when you vote (which would be "ballot marking devices" predominantly). These are the machines in the back office that count the votes and store the official results.


What we see here is that "system logs" can tell us a lot of interesting things about the system. There's good reason to retain them in the future.

On the other hand, they generally can't answer the most important question: whether the system was hacked and votes flipped.

Mike Lindell claims to have "Absolute Proof" that Chinese hackers flipped votes throughout the country, including Maricopa County. If so, this would've been the system that the Chinese hackers would've hacked. Yet, in the system image, there is no evidence of this. By this, I mean the Mesa1 image, the one from before the system logs were deleted (obviously, there would be nothing in the Mesa2 image).

This lack of hacking evidence in the logs isn't proof that it didn't happen, though. The fact is, the logs aren't comprehensive enough to record most hacks, and the hackers could've deleted the logs anyway. That's why system logs aren't considered "election records" and that laws don't mandate keeping them: they could have some utility, as I've shown above, but they really wouldn't show the things that we most want to know.

Sunday, October 31, 2021

Debunking: that Jones Alfa-Trump report

The Alfa-Trump conspiracy-theory has gotten a new life. Among the new things is a report done by Democrat operative Daniel Jones [*]. In this blogpost, I debunk that report.

If you'll recall, the conspiracy-theory comes from anomalous DNS traffic captured by cybersecurity researchers. In the summer of 2016, while Trump was denying involvement with Russian banks, the Alfa Bank in Russia was doing lookups on the name "mail1.trump-email.com". During this time,  additional lookups were also coming from two other organizations with suspicious ties to Trump, Spectrum Health and Heartland Payments.

This is certainly suspicious, but people have taken it further. They have crafted a conspiracy-theory to explain the anomaly, namely that these organizations were secretly connecting to a Trump server.

We know this explanation to be false. There is no Trump server, no real server at all, and no connections. Instead, the name was created and controlled by Cendyn. The server the name points to for transmitting bulk email and isn't really configured to accept connections. It's built for outgoing spam, not incoming connections. The Trump Org had no control over the name or the server. As Cendyn explains, the contract with the Trump Org ended in March 2016, after which they re-used the IP address for other marketing programs, but since they hadn't changed the DNS settings, this caused lookups of the DNS name.

This still doesn't answer why Alfa, Spectrum, Heartland, and nobody else were doing the lookups. That's still a question. But the answer isn't secret connections to a Trump server. The evidence is pretty solid on that point.

Sunday, October 24, 2021

Review: Dune (2021)

One of the most important classic sci-fi stories is the book "Dune" from Frank Herbert. It was recently made into a movie. I thought I'd write a quick review.

The summary is this: just read the book. It's a classic for a good reason, and you'll be missing a lot by not reading it.

But the movie Dune (2021) movie is very good. The most important thing to know is see it in IMAX. IMAX is this huge screen technology that partly wraps around the viewer, and accompanied by huge speakers that overwhelm you with sound. If you watch it in some other format, what was visually stunning becomes merely very pretty.

Wednesday, October 13, 2021

Fact check: that "forensics" of the Mesa image is crazy

Tina Peters, the elections clerk from Mesa County (Colorado) went rogue, creating a "disk-image" of the election server, and posting that image to the public Internet. Conspiracy theorists have been analyzing the disk-image trying to find anomalies supporting their conspiracy-theories. A recent example is this "forensics" report. In this blogpost, I debunk that report.

Sunday, October 10, 2021

100 terabyte home NAS

So, as a nerd, let's say you need 100 terabytes of home storage. What do you do?

My solution would be a commercial NAS RAID, like from Synology, QNAP, or Asustor. I'm a nerd, and I have setup my own Linux systems with RAID, but I'd rather get a commercial product. When a disk fails, and a disk will always eventually fail, then I want something that will loudly beep at me and make it easy to replace the drive and repair the RAID.

Friday, September 24, 2021

Check: that Republican audit of Maricopa

Author: Robert Graham (@erratarob)

Later today (Friday, September 24, 2021), Republican auditors release their final report on what they found with elections in Maricopa county. Draft copies of the report have already circulated online. In this blogpost, I write up my comments on the cybersecurity portions of their draft.


The three main problems are:

  • They misapply cybersecurity principles that are meaningful for normal networks, but which don’t really apply to the "air gapped" networks we see here.
  • They make some errors about technology, especially networking.
  • They are overstretching themselves to find dirt, claiming the things they don't understand are evidence of something bad.

In the parts below, I pick apart individual pieces from that document to demonstrate these criticisms. I focus on section 7, the cybersecurity section, and ignore the other parts of the document, where others are more qualified than I to opine.

In short, when corrected, section 7 is nearly empty of any content.