To scan the Internet, I started with masscan, my Internet-scale port scanner, looking for port 3389, the one used by Remote Desktop. This takes a couple hours, and lists all the devices running Remote Desktop -- in theory.
This returned 7,629,102 results (over 7-million). However, there is a lot of junk out there that'll respond on this port. Only about half are actually Remote Desktop.
Masscan only finds the open ports, but is not complex enough to check for the vulnerability. Remote Desktop is a complicated protocol. A project was posted that could connect to an address and test it, to see if it was patched or vulnerable. I took that project and optimized it a bit, rdpscan, then used it to scan the results from masscan. It's a thousand times slower, but it's only scanning the results from masscan instead of the entire Internet.
The table of results is as follows:
1447579 UNKNOWN - receive timeout
1414793 SAFE - Target appears patched
1294719 UNKNOWN - connection reset by peer
1235448 SAFE - CredSSP/NLA required
923671 VULNERABLE -- got appid
651545 UNKNOWN - FIN received
438480 UNKNOWN - connect timeout
105721 UNKNOWN - connect failed 9
82836 SAFE - not RDP but HTTP
24833 UNKNOWN - connection reset on connect
3098 UNKNOWN - network error
2576 UNKNOWN - connection terminated
The various UNKNOWN things fail for various reasons. A lot of them are because the protocol isn't actually Remote Desktop and respond weirdly when we try to talk Remote Desktop. A lot of others are Windows machines, sometimes vulnerable and sometimes not, but for some reason return errors sometimes.
The important results are those marked VULNERABLE. There are 923,671 vulnerable machines in this result. That means we've confirmed the vulnerability really does exist, though it's possible a small number of these are "honeypots" deliberately pretending to be vulnerable in order to monitor hacker activity on the Internet.
The next result are those marked SAFE due to probably being "pached". Actually, it doesn't necessarily mean they are patched Windows boxes. They could instead be non-Windows systems that appear the same as patched Windows boxes. But either way, they are safe from this vulnerability. There are 1,414,793 of them.
The next result to look at are those marked SAFE due to CredSSP/NLA failures, of which there are 1,235,448. This doesn't mean they are patched, but only that we can't exploit them. They require "network level authentication" first before we can talk Remote Desktop to them. That means we can't test whether they are patched or vulnerable -- but neither can the hackers. They may still be exploitable via an insider threat who knows a valid username/password, but they aren't exploitable by anonymous hackers or worms.
The next category is marked as SAFE because they aren't Remote Desktop at all, but HTTP servers. In other words, in response to our Remote Desktop request they send an HTTP response. There are 82,836 of these.
Thus, out of 7.6-million devices that respond to port 3389, we find 3.5-million that reliably talk the Remote Desktop protocol, of which 0.9-million are vulnerable, and the rest are not.
But, since a lot of those "unknowns" are due to transient network errors, then in theory I should be able to rescan them and get some more results. I did this and go the following update:
28182 SAFE - Target appears patched
19991 VULNERABLE -- got appid
17560 SAFE - CredSSP/NLA required
695 SAFE - not RDP but HTTP
A third rescan got the following results:
9838 SAFE - Target appears patched
7084 SAFE - CredSSP/NLA required
6041 VULNERABLE -- got appid
2963 UNKNOWN - network error
45 SAFE - not RDP but HTTP
Some of these rescans are likely overcoming transient errors that preventing getting results the first time. However, others are likely ISPs with Windows machines moving around from one IP address to another, so that continued rescans are going to get distorted results rather than cleaning up the previous results.
The upshot is that these tests confirm that roughly 950,000 machines are on the public Internet that are vulnerable to this bug. Hackers are likely to figure out a robust exploit in the next month or two and cause havoc with these machines.
There are two things you should do to guard yourself. The first is to apply Microsoft's patches, including old Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Windows 7 desktops and servers.
More importantly, for large organizations, is to fix their psexec problem that allows such things to spread via normal user networking. You may have only one old WinXP machine that's vulnerable, that you don't care if it gets infected with ransomware. But, that machine may have a Domain Admin logged in, so that when the worm breaks in, it grab those credentials and uses them to log onto the Domain Controller. Then, from the Domain Controller, the worm sends a copy of itself to all the desktop and servers in the organization, using those credentials instead of the vuln. This is what happened with notPetya: the actual vulnerability wasn't the problem, it was psexec that was the problem.
For patching systems, you have to find them on the network. My rdpscan tool mentioned above is good for scanning small networks. For large networks, you'll probably want to do the same masscan/rdpscan combination that I used to scan the entire Internet. On GitHub, rdpscan has precompiled programs that work on the command-line, but the source is there for you to compile it yourself, in case you don't trust I'm tryin to infect you with a virus.
First thing, great blog and research.
As for defense, I have three more options;
1.Turn off RDP if you don't need it. Then, even unpatched PCs are safe.
2. Use a router to re-route a non-standard listening port to 3389 internally. This way, scans for port 3389 will not find anything.
3.On Windows, zap the registry to listen on a non-standard port.
And, the usual suspects: network segmentation and use a different remote control product.
RDP (and SSH) exposed to the entire internet is the root of all evil.
We started dome9.com 8 years ago to change that. Sadly this is still a thing in 2019.
Hmm. Millions of EC2 instances expose ssh to the internet, with zero exploits. Except for shoulder surfing and stolen ppk/[rd]sa creds. But don't let the facts interfere with mass hysteria. I just checked an array of possible rdp vulnerable machines, every single path was already patched. It's a serious thing to do, right away, but the important thing is to have a catalog of access vectors, and know how to check and implement the patches. Microsoft makes it pretty easy. There really is no excuse for companies and cities that get hacked, except I do have sympathy for the health care providers that have a lot of specialty devices running xp and older.
Took a slightly different look at it here: http://core.intrigue.io/2019/06/03/bluekeep-cve-2019-0708-fortune-500-external-exposure/
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