Friday, January 13, 2017

About that Giuliani website...

Rumors are that Trump is making Rudy Giuliani some sort of "cyberczar" in the new administration. Therefore, many in the cybersecurity scanned his website "www.giulianisecurity.com" to see if it was actually secure from hackers. The results have been laughable, with out-of-date software, bad encryption, unnecessary services, and so on.

But here's the deal: it's not his website. He just contracted with some generic web designer to put up a simple page with just some basic content. It's there only because people expect if you have a business, you also have a website.

That website designer in turn contracted some basic VPS hosting service from Verio. It's a service Verio exited around March of 2016, judging by the archived page.

The Verio service promised "security-hardened server software" that they "continually update and patch". According to the security scans, this is a lie, as the software is all woefully out-of-date. According OS fingerprint, the FreeBSD image it uses is 10 years old. The security is exactly what you'd expect from a legacy hosting company that's shut down some old business.

You can probably break into Giuliani's server. I know this because other FreeBSD servers in the same data center have already been broken into, tagged by hackers, or are now serving viruses.

But that doesn't matter. There's nothing on Giuliani's server worth hacking. The drama over his security, while an amazing joke, is actually meaningless. All this tells us is that Verio/NTT.net is a crappy hosting provider, not that Giuliani has done anything wrong.









Monday, January 09, 2017

NAT is a firewall

NAT is a firewall. It's the most common firewall. It's the best firewall.

I thought I'd point this out because most security experts might disagree, pointing to some "textbook definition". This is wrong.

No, Yahoo! isn't changing its name

Trending on social media is how Yahoo is changing it's name to "Altaba" and CEO Marissa Mayer is stepping down. This is false.

What is happening instead is that everything we know of as "Yahoo" (including the brand name) is being sold to Verizon. The bits that are left are a skeleton company that holds stock in Alibaba and a few other companies. Since the brand was sold to Verizon, that investment company could no longer use it, so chose "Altaba". Since 83% of its investment is in Alibabi, "Altaba" makes sense. It's not like this new brand name means anything -- the skeleton investment company will be wound down in the next year, either as a special dividend to investors, sold off to Alibaba, or both.

Marissa Mayer is an operations CEO. Verizon didn't want her to run their newly acquired operations, since the entire point of buying them was to take the web operations in a new direction (though apparently she'll still work a bit with them through the transition). And of course she's not an appropriate CEO for an investment company. So she had no job left -- she made her own job disappear.


What happened today is an obvious consequence of Alibaba going IPO in September 2014. It meant that Yahoo's stake of 16% in Alibaba was now liquid. All told, the investment arm of Yahoo was worth $36-billion while the web operations (Mail, Fantasy, Tumblr, etc.) was worth only $5-billion.

In other words, Yahoo became a Wall Street mutual fund who inexplicably also offered web mail and cat videos.

Such a thing cannot exist. If Yahoo didn't act, shareholders would start suing the company to get their money back.That $36-billion in investments doesn't belong to Yahoo, it belongs to its shareholders. Thus, the moment the Alibaba IPO closed, Yahoo started planning on how to separate the investment arm from the web operations.

Yahoo had basically three choices.
  • The first choice is simply give the Alibaba (and other investment) shares as a one time dividend to Yahoo shareholders. 
  • A second choice is simply split the company in two, one of which has the investments, and the other the web operations. 
  • The third choice is to sell off the web operations to some chump like Verizon.

Obviously, Marissa Mayer took the third choice. Without a slushfund (the investment arm) to keep it solvent, Yahoo didn't feel it could run its operations profitably without integration with some other company. That meant it either had to buy a large company to integrate with Yahoo, or sell the Yahoo portion to some other large company.


Every company, especially Internet ones, have a legacy value. It's the amount of money you'll get from firing everyone, stop investing in the future, and just raking in year after year a stream of declining revenue. It's the fate of early Internet companies like Earthlink and Slashdot. It's like how I documented with Earthlink [*], which continues to offer email to subscribers, but spends only enough to keep the lights on, not even upgrading to the simplest of things like SSL.

Presumably, Verizon will try to make something of a few of the properties. Apparently, Yahoo's Fantasy sports stuff is popular, and will probably be rebranded as some new Verizon thing. Tumblr is already it's own brand name, independent of Yahoo, and thus will probably continue to exist as its own business unit.

One of the weird things is Yahoo Mail. It permanently bound to the "yahoo.com" domain, so you can't do much with the "Yahoo" brand without bringing Mail along with it. Though at this point, the "Yahoo" brand is pretty tarnished. There's not much new you can put under that brand anyway. I can't see how Verizon would want to invest in that brand at all -- just milk it for what it can over the coming years.


The investment company cannot long exist on its own. Investors want their money back, so they can make future investment decisions on their own. They don't want the company to make investment choices for them.

Think about when Yahoo made its initial $1-billion investment for 40% of Alibaba in 2005, it did not do so because it was a good "investment opportunity", but because Yahoo believed it was good strategic investment, such as providing an entry in the Chinese market, or providing an e-commerce arm to compete against eBay and Amazon. In other words, Yahoo didn't consider as a good way of investing its money, but a good way to create a strategic partnership -- one that just never materialized. From that point of view, the Alibaba investment was a failure.

In 2012, Marissa Mayer sold off 25% of Alibaba, netting $4-billion after taxes. She then lost all $4-billion on the web operations. That stake would be worth over $50-billion today. You can see the problem: companies with large slush funds just fritter them away keeping operations going. Marissa Mayer abused her position of trust, playing with money that belong to shareholders.

Thus, Altbaba isn't going to play with shareholder's money. It's a skeleton company, so there's no strategic value to investments. They can make no better investment choices than its shareholders can with their own money. Thus, the only purpose of the skeleton investment company is to return the money back to the shareholders. I suspect it'll choose the most tax efficient way of doing this, like selling the whole thing to Alibaba, which just exchanges the Altaba shares for Alibaba shares, with a 15% bonus representing the value of the other Altaba investments. Either way, if Altaba is still around a year from now, it's because it's board is skimming money that doesn't belong to them.



Key points:

  • Altaba is the name of the remaining skeleton investment company, the "Yahoo" brand was sold with the web operations to Verizon.
  • The name Altaba sucks because it's not a brand name that will stick around for a while -- the skeleton company is going to return all its money to its investors.
  • Yahoo had to spin off its investments -- there's no excuse for 90% of its market value to be investments and 10% in its web operations.
  • In particular, the money belongs to Yahoo's investors, not Yahoo the company. It's not some sort of slush fund Yahoo's executives could use. Yahoo couldn't use that money to keep its flailing web operations going, as Marissa Mayer was attempting to do.
  • Most of Yahoo's web operations will go the way of Earthlink and Slashdot, as Verizon milks the slowly declining revenue while making no new investments in it.



Friday, January 06, 2017

Notes about the FTC action against D-Link

Today, the FTC filed a lawsuit[*] against D-Link for security problems, such as backdoor passwords. I thought I'd write up some notes.

The suit is not "product liability", but "unfair and deceptive" business practices for promising "security". In addition, they interpret "security" different from the cybersecurity community.

This needs to be stressed because right now in our industry, there is a big discussion of product liability, insisting that everything attached to the Internet needs to be secured. People will therefore assume the FTC action is based on "liability".

Instead, all six counts are based upon the fact that D-Link offers its products for securing networks, and claims they are secure. Because they have backdoor passwords, clear-text passwords, command-injection bugs, and public private-keys, the FTC feels the claims of security to be untrue.

The key point I'm trying to make is that D-Link can resolve the suit (in theory) by simply removing all claims of "security". Sure, it can claim it supports stateful-inspection firewalls and WPA2, but not things like "WPA2 security". (Sure, the FTC may come back with a new lawsuit -- but it would solve the points raised in this one).

On the other hand, while "deception" is the law the FTC uses, their obvious real intent is to improve security. They intend for D-Link to remove it's security weakness, not to change its claims. The lawsuit is also intended to scare all IoT makers into securing their products, not to remove claims of security.

We see this intent in other posts on the FTC website. They've long been talking about IoT security. Recently, they announced a contest giving out $25,000 to the best solution for patching out-of-date IoT devices [*]. It's a silly contest, but shows what their real intent is.

Thus, the language of the lawsuit is very much about improving security, while the actual counts are about unfair/deceptive practices.

This is nonsense for a number of reasons. Among their claims is that D-Link lied to their customers for saying "you need to change the default password to secure the device", because the device still had a command-injection bug. That's a shocking departure from common sense. We in the cybersecurity community repeatedly advise people to change passwords to make devices more secure, ignoring any other insecurity that might exist. It means I'm just as deceptive as D-Link is.

The FTC's action is a clear violation of "due process". They didn't create a standard ahead of time of bugs that it would consider making a product "insecure", but instead arbitrarily punished D-Link for not meeting an unknown standard "secure". They never published a document saying "you can't advertise your product as being 'secure' if it contains this list of problems".

More to the point, their idea of "secure" is at odds with the cybersecurity community. We would indeed describe WPA2 as secure, regardless of some other feature of the device that makes it insecure. Most IoT devices are intended to be used behind a firewall anyway, so the only attack surface is the WiFi network. In such cases, the device can have backdoor passwords up the ying-yang, and we in the cybersecurity community will still call this "secure".

This is important because no product will ever be perfectly secure. Ten years from now, hackers will still discover some bug in some IoT product that nobody considered before, and the FTC will come down on them and punish them for deceptive practice. This is also counterproductive to the FTC's goals: if they are going to be so unfair about it, they are going to create incentives for companies to produce the wrong solution, to stop advertising their products as "secure".


The consequence of this action against D-Link is that the FTC is going to create an enormous chilling effect on innovation. As apps and IoT devices proliferate, the FTC is going to punish those on the forefront creating new and innovative products. At the same time, it's going to have little impact on actual security. They'll raise the price of brand-name products, while still being unable to target the white-box/no-name products that contain most of the vulnerabilities.



D-Link's makes a standard claim that we always make in the security industry:


...and then the FTC sues them for it.


Thursday, January 05, 2017

Profs: you should use JavaScript to teach Computer Science

Universities struggle with the canonical programming language they should teach students for Computer Science. Ideally, as they take computer science classes, all the homework assignments and examples will be in the same language. Today, that language is usually Java or Python. It should be JavaScript.

The reason for this is simple: whatever language you learn, you will also have to learn JavaScript, because it's the lingua franca of web browsers.

Python is a fundamentally broken language. Version 3 is incompatible with version 2, but after a decade, version 2 is still more popular. It's still unforgivably slow: other languages use JITs as a matter of course to get near native speed, while Python is still nearly always interpreted. Python isn't used in the real world, it's far down the list of languages programmers will use professionally. Python is primarily a middlware language, with neither apps nor services written in it.

Java is a fine language, but there's a problem with it: it's fundamentally controlled by a single company, Oracle, who is an evil company. Consumer versions of Java come with viruses. They sue those who try to come up with competing versions of Java. It's not an "open" system necessary for universities.

JavaScript has none of these problems. It's an open standard with many competing versions, two of which are completely open-source. New versions of the language are backwards compatible, but everyone stays closely up to date with the latest version anyway. It's extremely fast, as browsers vendors compete among themselves for the fastest JavaScript engine. It's used professionally everywhere, from writing phone apps to writing network services. And as mentioned above, everyone has to learn it eventually, because it's the language of web browsers.

It's a great "software engineering" language. Most IDEs support it, but especially Microsoft's "Visual Code", which provides the same IDE for Windows, Mac, and Linux for editing and debugging JavaScript. A cross-platform IDE that works the same for all students, regardless of desktop, is an enormous plus. All the other "software engineering" features work well with JavaScript as well, such as professional requirements of version control, bug tracking, and unit/regression testing.

It's an adequate "computer science" language. It supports all the major paradigms, like object-oriented and functional programming. It's perfect for teaching algorithms, data structures, complexity, boolean logic, number theory, Like most programming languages, it's got great library support for things like graphics, machine learning, robotics, cryptography, networking, databases, and so on.

One weakness is that it's not "multithreaded", but that's pretty much a weakness in every language except maybe Erlang. Even in C, people are taught to do it wrong (mutexes) instead of the right way (scalable).

JavaScript certainly has some quirks, but those are a feature for education, not a fault. Educators should go into a deep-dive with JavaScript explaining how it differs from other programming language. Explain how JavaScript pointers differ from C pointers, how object-oriented features differ from Java/C++, how functional features differ from LISP. A deep dive into things like AsmJS and JITs will teach you a lot about all languages.

It's not adequate to teach all computer science concepts, of course. If you are teaching scientific computing, then things like MATLAB and R will be better -- but those languages are impractical for other computer science topics.


In short, unlike any other language, everyone eventually has to learn JavaScript, in order to work within the browser. Given that, then we might as well use it as a pedagogical language. For most computer science topics, it's as least as good as any other language, like C, Java, or Python.

Tuesday, January 03, 2017

Dear Obama, From Infosec

Dear President Obama:

We are more than willing to believe Russia was responsible for the hacked emails/records that influenced our election. We believe Russian hackers were involved. Even if these hackers weren't under the direct command of Putin, we know he could put a stop to such hacking if he chose. It's like harassment of journalists and diplomats. Putin encourages a culture of thuggery that attacks opposition, without his personal direction, but with his tacit approval.

Your lame attempts to convince us of what we already agree with has irretrievably damaged your message.

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Your absurd story doesn't make me a Snowden apologist

Defending truth in the Snowden Affair doesn't make one an "apologist", for either side. There plenty of ardent supporters on either side that need to be debunked. The latest (anti-Snowden) example is the HPSCI committee report on Snowden [*], and stories like this one in the Wall Street Journal [*]. Pointing out the obvious holes doesn't make us "apologists".

As Edward Epstein documents in the WSJ story, one of the lies Snowden told was telling his employer (Booz-Allen) that he was being treated for epilepsy when in fact he was fleeing to Hong Kong in order to give documents to Greenwald and Poitras.

Well, of course he did. If you are going to leak a bunch of documents to the press, you can't do that without deceiving your employer. That's the very definition of this sort of "whistleblowing". Snowden has been quite open to the public about the lies he told his employer, including this one.

Rather than evidence that there's something wrong with Snowden, the way Snowden-haters (is that the opposite of "apologist"?) seize on this is evidence that they are a bit unhinged.


The next "lie" is the difference between the number of documents Greenwald says he received (10,000) and the number investigators claim were stolen (1.5 million). This is not the discrepancy that it seems. A "document" counted by the NSA is not the same as the number of "files" you might get on a thumb drive, which was shown the various ways of counting the size of the Chelsea/Bradley Manning leaks. Also, the NSA can only see which files Snowden accessed, not which ones were then subsequently copied to a thumb drive.

Finally, there is the more practical issue that Snowden cannot review the documents while at work. He'd have to instead download databases and copy whole directories to his thumb drives. Only away from work would he have the chance to winnow down which documents he wanted to take to Hong Kong, deleting the rest. Nothing Snowden has said conflicts with him deleting lots of stuff he never gave journalists, that he never took with him to Hong Kong, or took with him to Moscow.


The next "lie" is that Snowden claims the US revoked his passport after he got on the plane from Hong Kong and before he landed in Moscow.

This is factually wrong, in so far as the US had revoked his passport (and issued an arrest warrant) and notified Hong Kong of the revocation a day before the plane took off. However, as numerous news reports of the time reported, the US information [in the arrest warrant] was contradictory and incomplete, and thus Hong Kong did nothing to stop Snowden from leaving [*]. The Guardian [*] quotes a Hong Kong official as saying Snowden left "through a lawful and normal channel". Seriously, countries are much less concerned about checking passports of passenger leaving than those arriving.

It's the WSJ article that's clearly prevaricating here, quoting a news article where a Hong Kong official admits being notified, but not quoting the officials saying that the information was bad, that they took no action, and that Snowden left in the normal way.


The next item is Snowden's claim he destroyed all his copies of US secrets before going to Moscow. To debunk this, the WSJ refers to an NPR interview [*] with Frants Klintsevich, deputy chairman of the defense and security committee within the Duma at the time. Klintsevich is quoted as saying "Let's be frank, Snowden did share intelligence".

But Snowden himself debunks this:
The WSJ piece was written a week after this tweet. It's hard to imagine why they ignored it. Either it itself is a lie (in which case, it should've been added to the article), or it totally debunks the statement. If Klintsevich is "only speculating", then nothing after that point can be used to show Snowden is lying.

Thus, again we have proof that Epstein cannot be trusted. He clearly has an angle and bends evidence to service that angle, rather than being a reliable source of information.


I am no Snowden apologist. Most of my blogposts regarding Snowden have gone the other way, criticizing the way those like The Intercept distort Snowden disclosures in an anti-NSA/anti-USA manner. In areas of my experience (network stuff), I've blogged showing that those reporting on Snowden are clearly technically deficient.

But in this post, I show how Edward Epstein is clearly biased/untrustworthy, and how he adjusts the facts into a character attack on Snowden. I've documented it in a clear way that you can easily refute if I'm not correct. This is not because I'm a biased toward Snowden, but because I'm biased toward the truth.

Thursday, December 29, 2016

Some notes on IoCs

Obama "sanctioned" Russia today for those DNC/election hacks, kicking out 35 diplomats (**), closing diplomatic compounds (**), seizing assets of named individuals/groups (***). They also published "IoCs" of those attacks, fingerprints/signatures that point back to the attackers, like virus patterns, file hashes, and IP addresses.

These IoCs are of low quality. They are published as a political tool, to prove they have evidence pointing to Russia. They have limited utility to defenders, or those publicly analyzing attacks.

Consider the Yara rule included in US-CERT's "GRIZZLY STEPPE" announcement:


What is this? What does this mean? What do I do with this information?

It's a YARA rule. YARA is a tool ostensibly for malware researchers, to quickly classify files. It's not really an anti-virus product designed to prevent or detect an intrusion/infection, but to analyze an intrusion/infection afterward -- such as attributing the attack. Signatures like this will identify a well-known file found on infected/hacked systems.

What this YARA rule detects is, as the name suggests, the "PAS TOOL WEB KIT", a web shell tool that's popular among Russia/Ukraine hackers. If you google "PAS TOOL PHP WEB KIT", the second result points to the tool in question. You can download a copy here [*], or you can view it on GitHub here [*].

Once a hacker gets comfortable with a tool, they tend to keep using it. That implies the YARA rule is useful at tracking the activity of that hacker, to see which other attacks they've been involved in, since it will find the same web shell on all the victims.

The problem is that this P.A.S. web shell is popular, used by hundreds if not thousands of hackers, mostly associated with Russia, but also throughout the rest of the world (judging by hacker forum posts). This makes using the YARA signature for attribution problematic: just because you found P.A.S. in two different places doesn't mean it's the same hacker.

A web shell, by the way, is one of the most common things hackers use once they've broken into a server. It allows further hacking and exfiltration traffic to appear as normal web requests. It typically consists of a script file (PHP, ASP, PERL, etc.) that forwards commands to the local system. There are hundreds of popular web shells in use.

We have little visibility into how the government used these IoCs. IP addresses and YARA rules like this are weak, insufficient for attribution by themselves. On the other hand, if they've got web server logs from multiple victims where commands from those IP addresses went to this specific web shell, then the attribution would be strong that all these attacks are by the same actor.

In other words, these rules can be a reflection of the fact the government has excellent information for attribution. Or, it could be a reflection that they've got only weak bits and pieces. It's impossible for us outsiders to tell. IoCs/signatures are fetishized in the cybersecurity community: they love the small rule, but they ignore the complexity and context around the rules, often misunderstanding what's going on. (I've written thousands of the things -- I'm constantly annoyed by the ignorance among those not understanding what they mean).

I see on twitter people praising the government for releasing these IoCs. What I'm trying to show here is that I'm not nearly as enthusiastic about their quality.



Note#1: BTW, the YARA rule has to trigger on the PHP statements, not on the imbedded BASE64 encoded stuff. That's because it's encrypted with a password, so could be different for every hacker.

Note#2: Yes, the hackers who use this tool can evade detection by minor changes that avoid this YARA rule. But that's not a concern -- the point is to track the hacker using this tool across many victims, to attribute attacks. The point is not to act as an anti-virus/intrusion-detection system that triggers on "signatures".

Note#3: Publishing the YARA rule burns it. The hackers it detects will presumably move to different tools, like PASv4 instead of PASv3. Presumably, the FBI/NSA/etc. have a variety of YARA rules for various web shells used by know active hackers, to attribute attacks to various groups. They aren't publishing these because they want to avoid burning those rules.

Note#4: The PDF from the DHS has pretty diagrams about the attacks, but it doesn't appears this web shell was used in any of them. It's difficult to see where it fits in the overall picture.



(**) No, not really. Apparently, kicking out the diplomats was punishment for something else, not related to the DNC hacks.

(***) It's not clear if these "sanctions" have any teeth.